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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> Scottish Court of Session Decisions >> Ahmed (AP), Re Application For Judicial Review [2001] ScotCS 57 (9 March 2001)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/scot/cases/ScotCS/2001/57.html
Cite as: [2001] ScotCS 57, 2001 SCLR 623

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OUTER HOUSE, COURT OF SESSION

P50/14A/99

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

OPINION OF LORD McEWAN

in the cause

NASIM AHMED (AP)

Petitioner;

for Judicial Review of a decision dated 17th June 1999 of the Secretary of State for the Home Department refusing to grant the Petitioner leave to remain in the United Kingdom

________________

 

 

Petitioner: Miss Williamson; Lindsays, W.S. (for Gray & Co., Glasgow)

Respondent: Lindsay; Scottish Executive

9 March 2001

[1] The facts, on the basis of which the petitioner makes his application, are not in dispute and may be stated shortly. He is a man of 54 and a citizen of Pakistan. In 1990 he came to the United Kingdom on a six month visitor's visa. He subsequently applied for asylum but after sundry proceedings including judicial review this was refused. His deportation was ordered and the relevant Order was signed in December 1996. On 8 October 1997 at Glasgow he married one J.K. a U.K. citizen. His application for leave to remain was made on the basis of this marriage.

[2] The relevant Statutory Provisions are in the following terms.

[3] It is provided by the Immigration Act 1971, section 3(1)(b) that,

"... (a person) may be given leave to enter the United Kingdom (or, when already there, leave to remain in the United Kingdom) either for a limited or for an indefinite period; ...".

The matter is thus one for the wide discretion of the Secretary of State.

[4] The Act goes on to place a duty on the Minister to lay before Parliament rules as to practice to be following in the administration of the Act (section 3(2)).

[5] The rule in point for present purposes is Rule 284(v) which in providing for an extension of stay as a spouse of a person present and settled in the U.K. requires that "... the marriage has not taken place after a decision has been made to deport the appellant ...(etc.) ...".

[6] The applicant here accepts that his marriage does not fulfil the requirement of this rule since enforcement actions pre-dated the marriage.

[7] In spite of the Rules it is clear that the Minister has power, through his officials, to exercise his discretion and make what has been described as an extra Statutory concession. This can have the effect of not enforcing the full rigour of the Rule.

[8] He has a policy to guide him and for present purposes that is DP3/96.

[9] Paragraph 8 is in point and is in these terms:

"8. Where a person marries after the commencement of enforcement action removal should normally be enforced. The criteria set out in paragraph 5 do not apply in such cases. Paragraph 284 of the Immigration Rules makes it clear that one of the requirements for an extension of stay on the spouse of a person present and settled in the United Kingdom is that 'the marriage has not taken place after a decision has been made to deport the applicant or he has been recommended for deportation ... Marriage cannot therefor in itself be considered a sufficiently compassionate factor to militate against removal ... The onus is on the subject to put forward any compelling compassionate factors that he/she wishes to be considered which must be supported by documentary evidence. Only in the most exceptional circumstances should removal action be stopped and the person allowed to stay ..."

[10] In the course of the argument I was referred to a number of authorities to some for which I will return in greater or lesser detail later. These were:

Scottish Authorities

Centralbite v Kincardine & Deeside Licensing Board [1989] S.C.L.R. 652;

Ahmed v Secretary of State for the Home Department 14 March 2000, Lord Eassie;

Abdadou v Secretary of State for the Home Department [1998] S.C.L.R 504;

Akhtar v Secretary of State for the Home Department 23 March 2000, Lord Eassie;

Rae v Criminal Injuries Compensation Board 1999 S.L.T. 291;

Saleem Ahmed v Secretary of State for the Home Department 25 March 2000 Lord Nimmo Smith;

Wordie &c v Secretary of State for the Home Department 1984 S.L.T. 345.

English Authorities

Ahmed v Secretary of State for the Home Office [1999] Imm. A.R. 22;

Associated Provincial Picture Houses v Wednesbury Cpn. [1948] 1 KB 223;

British Oxygen v Board of Trade [1971] AC 610;

Reg v Trade & Industry Secretary ex parte Lonrho Plc [1989] 1 W.L.R. 525;

Islam v Secretary of State for the Home Department [1999] 2 AC 629;

R v Home Secretary ex parte Bugdaycay [1987] 1 AC 514;

R v Secretary of State ex parte Singh [1997] 1 Imm. A.R. 331;

R v Secretary of State ex parte Isiko 20 December 2000 (Court of Appeal);

R v Secretary of State ex parte Mahmood 8 December 2000 (Court of Appeal).

Other Authorities (Strasbourg Cases)

Berrehab v Netherlands 1988 11 EHRR 322;

Abdulaziz &c v U.K. 1985 7 EHRR 471;

Poku v U.K. 15 May 1996 (No. 26985/95);

Moustaquim v Belgium (1991) 13 E.H.R.R. 82

Beldjoudi v France (1992) 14 EHR R 801;

Ajayi v United Kingdom 22 June 1999 (No. 27663/95);

Kingsley v United Kingdom, 9 January 2001, The Times.

[11] Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (Human Rights Act 1998, Schedule 1) is in the following terms:

"Right to respect for private and family life

1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.

2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals , or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others."

[12] The decision to deport the petitioner was maintained by the Immigration Officer in his decision dated 17 June 1999. The decision was sent to the petitioner's solicitors by letter of that date which stated :-

"Dear Sirs,

RE: NASIM AHMED

Thank you for your letter of 23 February on behalf of your above named client who is the subject of a deportation order but wishes to remain here on the basis of his marriage to a British citizen. I am sorry I have been unable to reply to you sooner.

I should inform you that your client's marriage cannot provide him with any claim to remain as it was contracted in the full knowledge that he was the subject of deportation proceedings since they were instigated on 24 November 1993. The Secretary of State therefore can only consider your client's marriage as a compassionate factor. However, it must be recognised that the situation in which your client now finds himself has been brought about entirely by his own actions. His wife may also be an unwilling recipient of the consequences of those actions. When your client is eventually removed from the United Kingdom it is appreciated that he and his wife may either be separated for quite some time if she chooses to remain there or, if she chooses to join him abroad, that it may be difficult for her to adjust to the circumstances in Pakistan. It is of course entirely her choice as to whether or not she joins her husband when he is deported. In any case, all the relevant factors have been carefully taken into account, including your representations, but, on balance, the Secretary of State has decided that your client's circumstances are not sufficiently compelling or compassionate to justify the revocation of the deportation order signed against him. He therefore rejects your request for him to be allowed to remain here as the spouse of a British citizen.

Also, the European Commission has frequently stated that Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights does not confer a right to enter or remain in a country. The Court has also stated that the duty imposed by Article 8 cannot be considered as amounting to a general obligation on the part of a state to respect the choice made by married couples of the country of their matrimonial residence and to accept the non-national spouse for settlement in that country (Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali). There are provisions within the Immigration Rules for a person to enter as the spouse of a British citizen or person settled here, if the criteria set out within the Rules are met. The Secretary of State does not consider the decision to refuse this application as a breach of the European Convention on Human Rights.

It is noted that your client lodged an asylum application more than 8 months after he entered this country and almost 2 months after he overstayed his leave to enter. Once it was refused, he then appealed both to a special adjudicator and to the Tribunal but did not attend either hearing in his defence. In the special adjudicator's determination of 17 June 1994, she stated that she would have expected a genuine asylum seeker to have made very effort to attend the appeal hearing based on the serious implications of an adverse decision. She concluded that your client's asylum claim lacked any credibility and was without merit. Nevertheless, your client then petitioned for a judicial review of the decision and that was dismissed on 14 July 1995. It would appear that your client's wish to appeal against a meritless asylum claim was an attempt to avoid or delay his removal from this country.

The Secretary of State therefore maintains his decision to deport your client and, as your client no longer has any claim to remain here, arrangements will shortly be made to remove him from this country as soon as possible. His wife may wish to join him upon his removal, at public expense if necessary.

Yours faithfully

N Brooke-Harte

Integrated Casework Directorate".

[13] For the petitioner Miss Williamson argued thus: she began by referring me to the various Statutes and rules which applied and which are referred to, helpfully, in the Petition itself.

[14] She accepted that the respondent was entitled to have a policy but argued that it could not be allowed to be pursued for the sake of consistency at the expense of the merits of individual cases. She referred me to British Oxygen and Lord Reid at 625 C/E. Her argument was two fold and she said that the decision letter showed a failure to take account of matters raised; and even if it did, it had not given any proper reasons. She said that silence on material points amounted to no reasons at all. She referred to Lonrho at 539/40.

[15] Miss Williamson's further argument may be now put in her series of eight careful propositions. There were:

[16] Firstly, that the respondent had erred in law and had misapplied his own guidelines. He has viewed the marriage as the compassionate factor only.

[17] Secondly, the respondent acted unreasonably by unduly restricting his consideration to the mere fact of the marriage. Under reference to Lonrho (at page 540A) she said that it was unclear which representation the Minister had agreed with. The evidence presented was so overwhelming that the response showed that there had been no proper consideration.

[18] Thirdly, it was unreasonable to imply that all that had happened was his own fault. In any case it was not clear whether this applied to the marriage itself or to the immigration history.

[19] Fourthly, the decision letter failed to take proper account of the problems for women in Pakistan related to sex and violence and to being of a religion that was not the prevailing one.

[20] Fifthly, even if these matters were considered, no proper reasons were given as to why the whole circumstances were not sufficiently exceptional to let him stay. She referred me to Ahmed at page 6 (Lord Eassie). Much more clarity was needed and it was not enough to say that "... all relevant factors have been carefully taken into account, including your representations ...". The court could not conclude that everything had been taken account of. She referred me to Bugdaycay at 531F (conceding as she had to that it was an asylum case where the appellant's safety might have been directly threatened.)

[21] Sixthly, the decision letter showed that no regard had been had to Foreign and Commonwealth Office advice to avoid all non-essential travel to Pakistan. It was unreasonable to place the "choice" of what was to happen on the petitioner's wife.

[22] Seventhly, the respondent had not carried out a proper balancing act under Article 8. The consequences to the petitioner of the decision were so disproportionate as to be unreasonable (Berrehab). The letter showed no balance between the need for immigration control and the petitioner's rights. I was again referred to Abdadou. The decision letter did not say enough and was thus disproportionate.

[23] Eighthly, the respondent had considered irrelevant matters. All he could consider were exceptional circumstances and not old history. It was wholly wrong to consider an alleged "... meritless asylum claim ...".

[24] In her final reply Miss Williamson repeated her attack on the reasons in the decision letter as being inadequate. By reference to very recent authority (Kingsley v U.K. Times Law Report, 9 January 2001) she pointed to the difficulty of using judicial review as a way of enforcing rights under the Convention. She asked me to supervise the decision in such an intrusive way as to be unable to find substantial justification for what had occurred and thus to negate the decision.

[25] In his reply Mr Lindsay made the following points.

[26] He said that the petitioner's argument was without merit since the decision was reasonable, proportionate and contained no errors in law. It had considered the individual circumstances; did not contravene Article 8 and even if it was harsh could not be challenged.

[27] Before developing these he referred me to Rule 281 of the Immigration Rules which would allow the petitioner to return to Pakistan and reapply to come here as he had a wife here. He then referred me to the marriage policy narrated in paragraph 8 of DP3/96. The onus was on the applicant "... to put forward any compelling compassionate factors ...". The policy was a fair and reasonable one as explained by Lord Woolf in Ahmed v Secretary of State (cit. sup.) at page 30 and its exercise was capable of being reviewed, R v Secretary of State ex parte Singh cit. sup. at 334 per Sedley J.

[28] As to No. 6/2 of Process (the decision letter) he said that it contained very full reasons. There was no duty to give any reasons provided the application was answered; and in this area of law such a failure could never be a free standing ground of appeal. (Lonrho at 539). He referred me to two recent decisions of Lord Eassie, Ahmed cit. sup. and Akhtar also cit. sup., both of which he said were in point.

[29] The proper approach by the court to a decision, such as this, was only a supervisory one. Counsel referred in detail to the recent decisions of the Court of Appeal in Isiko and Mahmood both cit. sup. It was clear that the court, reviewing the exercise of a discretion could not itself make the decision.

[30] Counsel then returned to the question of whether reasons had to be given. He referred me again to what Lord Keith said in Lonrho.

[31] He also looked again at the two decisions of Lord Eassie; and to Wordie. The respondent's position was that the decision letter would leave any uninformed reader in no doubt.

[32] Even if no reasons had been given the known circumstances did not overwhelmingly point in favour of a different decision. In a sense the petitioner was the author of his own misfortune. The post enforcement marriage was his own choice and this had been a matter of importance in many cases.

[33] However, the reasons in the decision letter showed they had regard to all known facts, the Convention and the history of the petitioner. It was not necessary to answer the application line by line.

[34] Mr Lindsay then addressed the detailed arguments of the petitioner in relation to the articles of the Petition as follows.

[35] As to 5.6 he said that the decision letter considered it and understood not just the marriage problems but the problems of going to Pakistan.

[36] As to paragraph 5.7 two things were clear; the "compelling compassionate factors" were properly considered, understood and the policy in DP3/96 was correctly applied.

[37] As to 5.8, it was clear that in the knowledge that he might be removed the petitioner altered his position. The respondent's decision was not Wednesbury unreasonable. The test was a high one as Lord Macfadyen had pointed out in Rae at 291. It could not be said to be outrageous.

[38] As to 5.9, the decision letter in paragraph 2 considered religious and sex discrimination.

[39] As to 5.10, the decision letter made it clear that the advice of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office was not only not disregarded but was taken into account. To do so was enough for an administrative decision. The petitioner's wife could not be compelled either way.

[40] Paragraph 5.12 raised a number of issues. The decision letter clearly showed that a balancing exercise was undertaken. The result was a proportionate response; one not in breach of Article 8 and also not unreasonable in the Wednesbury sense. Counsel referred to Mahmood and Abdulaziz in some detail. It was clear that the Minister and the court did not have to respect the choice of matrimonial residence. It was also proper to notice where applicants were the authors of their own misfortune. Reference was also made to Poku which seemed a harsher case and the cases of Berrehab, Moustaquim and Ajayi where in each case the Convention and Article 8 were in issue. Counsel also renewed his reference to the two decisions of Lord Eassie which again showed more extreme facts and Lord Nimmo Smith's decision in Saleem Ahmed where again the problems were self created.

Isiko was also revisited especially to show how Hidden J. had fallen into error.

[41] In the face of all these cases, most of which disclosed more severe circumstances, it could not be said that any error in law had occurred here.

[42] As to 5.13 it was perfectly proper to consider the immigration history which was in any case done obiter. It was reasonable to expect people to abide by the rules and in Poku the Commission said it was a proper subject of inquiry. The same point arose in Isiko.

[43] I was asked to sustain the respondent's Plea 2 and refuse the Petition.

[44] In spite of a very careful and well presented argument by the petitioner's counsel, I am firmly of the opinion that this Petition cannot succeed. The petitioner begins with the Minister's policy, deemed to be and accepted as lawful, against him in view of his choosing to marry after being ordered to be deported. He has to accept that by so marrying he cannot be seen to "jump the queue" against other immigrants waiting patiently in line to enter the U.K. The consequences of allowing any such thing to happen on a wide scale would be only too obvious. It may be that in this particular isolated case his remaining does not threaten the excepted interests under Article 8(2) but that in itself does not prevent the decision to enforce a lawful immigration policy which applies to him from being an unassailable decision.

[45] What then are the critical factors? I begin with the argument about reasons and the need for reasons. In my view, in this case the argument is nothing to the point. What the respondent has to do is to show that he has not shut his ears to the application (British Oxygen at 625). By the giving of full reasons he has demonstrated that he has been willing to listen. It has to be remembered that these decisions are taken by experienced civil servants on the Minister's behalf. They have to be presumed to be familiar with the law and policy on immigration and seized of best information and all material facts about the countries in question and the prevailing conditions there.

[46] It is in my view unarguable at common law that reasons had to be given at all but once they are there, the point disappears (except in relation to the Convention which I deal with further on). I thus do not regard Lonrho as being in point, although I will have to return to it in a different context.

[47] I now deal with the suggestion that by considering the immigration history the respondent was in some way biased or had taken account of an irrelevant matter. In my view there are two answers to this criticism. In the first place, what is said appears as a note towards the end of the letter and is not really part of the decision. Secondly, there is authority in favour of the view that it is perfectly proper to look at the history of any applicant. In Isiko at paragraphs 32 and 33 the history was examined in detail and was described as "deplorable". The same course of action can be seen in Mahmood at paragraph 5 (I observe that Mahmood's failure to attend mirrors the circumstances in the present case). The relevance of history was also the subject of comment in one of the Strasbourg cases (Poku at pages 7 and 8 of the copy supplied). I must also take account of that. In my view this argument cannot be maintained.

[48] The next smaller point is whether the decision letter implied that what had happened was in some way the fault of the petitioner. Assuming in Miss Williamson's favour that the letter does say and mean that, it can only apply to the marriage.

[49] In my opinion there is nothing inherently wrong in the Minister taking that common-sense view. He would be bound to come to that conclusion in a post deportation decision marriage unless the circumstances compelled a different view. Here they do not. Being aware that he might be removed the petitioner has altered his position. The authorities (e.g. Mahmood at paras. 47 and 48) make it quite clear that in immigration matters States are not obliged to accept the choice of residence of a married couple. It is also of relevance to note that such a "choice" (as the authorities describe it) has regularly been founded on in the cases referred to before me (see e.g. Poku at page 8). I reject this argument.

[50] Moving on from these subsidiary arguments, to what are the two main issues; I have to consider whether what was done was Wednesbury unreasonable and/or was in breach of Article 8 of the Convention.

[51] As I have already noticed, many authorities were referred to. In this case it is not necessary for me to undertake a review of these cases. Indeed to do so would almost seem impertinent. From them, however, I derive a number of propositions which relate to both the main issues. Inevitably from the way the case was argued the Wednesbury rules and the Convention principles are seen to mix with each other and overlap. There can be no escape from this nowadays, and it remains for a higher court to rationalise these in the future. (The problems were hinted at by Lord Ackner in R. v Home Secretary, ex parte Brind [1991] 1 AC 696 at 762 (not cited to me).

[52] All States are entitled to maintain public order by exercising their rights under well established international law to control the entry and residence of aliens. To that end they are entitled to institute and maintain policies in general and guidelines in detail, and to follow them even if seemingly harsh and unfeeling consequences happen in individual cases.

[53] Relating that general observation to the facts of this case and guided by the authorities I deduce the following.

One. In general the Secretary of State is better placed than the courts to see the wider view as to whether removal is justified as "necessary in the interests of a democratic society". There has to be a reasonable proportionality between the means employed and the legitimate aims to be achieved. Many ingredients will have to be considered and balanced by the Minister. The guidance in DP3/96 is the framework on which the ingredients are balanced by him.

Two. Parliament has assigned this duty to the Minister and he must account to the House for the proper performance of his duty.

Three. The court must closely scrutinise the facts in every case but cannot and should not say what it would do if it were the Secretary of State. The court cannot second guess the Minister, but can only say whether in conducting the balancing exercise at his discretion he has gone outside legitimate perimeters. That applies at first instance and on appeal.

Four. These perimeters might have as their boundaries the new public law grounds known as Convention rights (absolute or qualified). Then the test for the court would be one of proportionality and reasonable means.

Five. They might also or separately have as their boundaries the common law rules of Wednesbury unreasonableness (sometimes called traditional public law grounds).

Six. In both these cases there could be much overlap. It seems to me likely that in most cases where the response was disproportionate it would also be unreasonable.

Seven. Further where Convention rights are in issue the Strasbourg jurisprudence allows States a margin of appreciation as to how the Convention is to be applied in different States with different problems and different social conditions. That may mean the Convention is not applied in a uniform manner. The National (Municipal) Courts do not have any such margin of appreciation. However, they will generally not interfere if the Minister makes a decision within what is described as his "discretionary area of judgment" (sometimes also called his "margin of discretion" or "a reasonable range of responses). That decision is probably easier where the Convention right is qualified (as here) and less so if it is absolute. Proportionality is the test.

Eight However, the measure of scrutiny to be applied to all decisions on human rights will be properly understood as "the most anxious scrutiny". The more substantial the interference with the rights (described as "grave impact") the more justification must be found. The court must decide whether the decision maker could reasonably have concluded that the interference was necessary to achieve one or more of the legitimate aims recognised by the Convention. That will also mean taking account of the Strasbourg jurisprudence under section 2 of the Human Rights Act 1988.

[54] I first deal with whether the decision was unreasonable in the Wednesbury sense and for this purpose it is necessary to revisit Lonrho. As a subsidiary point in this case Miss Williamson said that even if reasons were given, the actual response in relation to the evidence showed that no proper consideration had been given to application. She referred me to what Lord Keith said at page 539/40:-

"... The absence of reasons for a decision where there is no duty to give these cannot of itself provide any support for the suggested irrationality of the decision. The only significance of the absence of reasons is that if all other known facts and circumstances appear to point overwhelmingly in favour of a different decision, the decision-maker, who has given no reasons, cannot complain if the court draws the inference that he had no rational reason for his decision ...".

[55] I am not sure that I agree with this as it seems to me to be an attempt to read words into Lord Keith's speech which are simply not there. However, since I conclude otherwise that the letter had given proper reasons it is not necessary to decide the point.

[56] To be Wednesbury unreasonable the petitioner has to show one of four things; firstly that there has been an error in law, secondly that the decision taker has taken account of irrelevant matters or not taken account of relevant matters or finally taken a decision which no reasonable Minister could ever have come to.

[57] In my view the decision letter contains no error in law, and could leave the uninformed reader in no doubt that all relevant matters had been taken into account. It is plain that all the problems in Pakistan (religious, sex discrimination, violence) were considered and understood. It is also clear that the respondent followed and explained his policy in DP3/96 and he applied the correct test of looking for (but not finding) "... any compelling compassionate factors ...". The decision was not limited to the marriage as the letter makes clear. I have already referred to the points about "fault" and history and repeat that it is perfectly in order for the petitioner's behaviour to be considered. The choices open to his wife are also considered. In my view, in an administrative decision of this nature it is not necessary for the decision letter to answer the application line by line.

[58] That leaves only the last test. Was the decision one which no reasonable decision taker could have made. That question must be answered in the negative. As the Master of the Rolls said in Wednesbury (230) "... to prove a case of that kind would require something overwhelming ...". In my view the circumstances here do not approach that high test. In Rae Lord Macfadyen said that the decision would have to be "perverse" (296J). That test is simply not met and I reject the criticism of the letter as being an unreasonable response to the application.

[59] The final matter is the Convention. I have already quoted Article 8 and again notice that the rights are qualified and not absolute. Has the respondent made his decision here within his discretionary area of judgment and in his response to the application proportionate? Does the decision letter survive the most anxious scrutiny?

[60] The letter itself says that factors have been balanced and what these are. For reasons already given in this Opinion, these are all proper factors; especially the factor about the choice of matrimonial residence. Also, and importantly, the respondent has pointed out the right of the petitioner to apply from abroad to enter as the spouse of a British citizen which of course his wife is.

[61] It is plain that the respondent had regard to authorities in reaching his decision and in my opinion he was entitled to do so. When all of these things are closely scrutinised in my view they survive and show that the respondent has given a proportionate response to the petitioner's Convention rights and one which I cannot interfere with.

[62] The matter becomes much clearer when regard is had to the pattern of authorities where Article 8 has been considered.

[63] In Scotland, the Outer House cases of Akhtar, Nisar Ahmed and Saleem Ahmed all disclose circumstances of greater hardship than exist here yet the decisions of the Minister were upheld. The same is true a fortiori in the recent decisions of the Court of Appeal in England (Isiko and Mahmood).

[64] As far as the Strasbourg cases are concerned I am not obliged to follow these, only to "take account" of them. From what was cited to me I detect a distinct reluctance to interfere in Ministerial discretion even in cases more extreme than the present. While cases differ, and that reluctance cannot be decisive, it cannot be ignored by me.

[65] Poku and Ajayi are two good examples where the court would not interfere in extreme cases and the same can be said of the trilogy reported as Abdulaziz. Only in the cases where there seems to be a close connection between the applicant and the relevant country has the court found a breach of Article 8 (Berrehab; Moustaquim and Beldjoudi) and been prepared to interfere.

[66] In the result I will repel the pleas-in-law for the petitioner; sustain the respondent's second plea and refuse the Petition.


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